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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THESIS
THE DEPARTMENT OF Transportation’s (DOT) Final Ruleon air charter brokers1 offers an important advancement in
private aviation. The previously ultraexclusive industry, requir-
ing massive capital expenditures for entry, is now accessible to
new entrepreneurs planning to capitalize on the new regulatory
framework.2 New entrants provide more competition to the ex-
isting fractional ownership and “jet card” companies operating
in the space. Meanwhile, consumer disclosure requirements
keep charterers informed and safe going forward. This major
regulatory shake-up will make private jet charter more user-
friendly and pave the way for more Uber-like services in the
industry.
B. OVERVIEW
There are essentially four ways an individual with means can
gain access to the world of private aviation. These include: (1)
full aircraft ownership; (2) fractional aircraft ownership; (3)
membership in a jet card program; or (4) aircraft charter.
Full aircraft ownership presents a host of fixed and ongoing
expenses. The major fixed expense is the high-capital require-
ment for purchasing the aircraft.3 Ongoing expenses include:
hangar fees, pilot fees, maintenance, insurance, and registra-
tion.4 This option is generally only viable for entities and indi-
viduals who are committed to private aviation and fly more than
300 hours per year.5
1 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867 (Sept.
17, 2018) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 295, 298).
2 Jennifer M. Nowak, DOT Publishes Long-Awaited Final Rule on Air Charter Bro-
kers, HOLLAND & KNIGHT AVIATION L. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2018), https://
www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2018/10/dot-publishes-longawaited-
final-rule-on-air-charte [https://perma.cc/3WXC-4KVK].
3 See Mile-High Millionaires: When Should You Buy a Jet?, CNBC (Oct. 11, 2013),
https://www.cnbc.com/2013/10/11/when-should-you-buy-a-jet-charter-plane-
private-cost-and-prices.html [https://perma.cc/4RY4-YZLF] (private jet prices
range from an average of $3,000,000 to $90,000,000).
4 See id. (ongoing costs of owning a private jet range from an average of
$700,000 to $4,000,000 per year); see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.7 (2011).
5 See David Baxt & James Palen, Presentation at the International Corporate Jet
& Helicopter Finance Conference: Wheels Up 4 (Feb. 2014), http://
www.corporatejetinvestor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/950-Wheels-Up-
CJI-Presentation_v8.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KS-84TT].
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Fractional aircraft ownership means that a person or entity
purchases or leases an interest in an aircraft.6 Usually, owners
are entitled to use the aircraft for a specified number of hours
per year based on their pro rata interest in the underlying air-
craft.7 In most instances, the owners share the cost of a manage-
ment team that is responsible for locating certified pilots and
crew members, as well as the costs for maintaining, housing, in-
suring, and dispatching the aircraft.8 The management fee is
normally distributed among the owners according to their per-
centage of ownership.9 Although fractional aircraft ownership is
a viable option for many entrants into the private aviation space,
there are still several major issues with it. Fractional ownership
has a very high capital requirement for entry.10 Notably, frac-
tional aircraft ownership is similar to owning a real estate time
share. Often, the aircraft is requested by multiple owners for
high travel dates.11 This leaves fractional owners without access
to an aircraft when they want to use that aircraft. Additionally, it
is incredibly hard to value a fractional share of an aircraft.12
A private jet card enables a user to pre-buy time on a specified
type of aircraft.13 The user can then book the aircraft through
the company that issues the card. That company arranges the
transportation in the specified aircraft and debits the user’s card
account. Although there are four types of private jet cards, for
the purpose of this Comment, the most common charter-based
private jet card is the type analyzed.14 Using the standard private
jet card, the company issuing the card acts as an air charter bro-
6 See Mark A. Dombroff, Liability and the Growth of Fractional Aircraft Ownership




10 See Mile-High Millionaires: When Should You Buy a Jet?, supra note 3.




13 See Peter Myers, Do You Want a Jet Card to Ride?, REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2012),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-private-jet-card-idUSLNE89P01920121026
[https://perma.cc/7T6L-EL5C].
14 See Doug Gollan, Explaining the Difference Between Broker, Fractional Fleet, Man-
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ker.15 The air charter broker organizes the requested trip on a
requested model of aircraft. The user pays a flat hourly rate for
the service.16 The broker deducts its fee from the hourly rate
before paying the charter operator or owner of the underlying
aircraft.17 This method of accessing private aviation is particu-
larly attractive and has boomed in recent years.18 The boom in
usage is a primary reason why the DOT began its rulemaking on
air charter brokers.19 The surge in use of private jet cards is
likely due to convenience, ease of use, and low capital require-
ments.20 Additionally, private jet card users enjoy less liability be-
cause they do not have an ownership interest in the aircraft.21
Instead, the aircraft is most commonly owned, operated, and
maintained by an independent charter service.22
An alternative to the jet-card option, direct aircraft charter is
by far the cheapest way for a user to access the world of private
aviation. Unlike using a jet card, direct aircraft charter requires
a user to interact directly with the direct air carrier on his or her
own behalf.23 Aircraft charter operations provide an aircraft di-
rectly to a user and are typically governed by 14 C.F.R. Part
135.24 These “Part 135” operators provide flight services directly
to a consumer or through an air charter broker. The least ex-
pensive way for a user to access a private aircraft is directly
15 Myers, supra note 13.
16 Frequently Asked Questions, PRIVATE JET CARD COMPARISONS, https://privatejet-
cardcomparisons.com/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/HM3D-
NNB4] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
17 See Doug Gollan, Is Private Jet Charter Ready for a New Pricing Model?, FORBES
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/douggollan/2018/02/28/is-pri
vate-jet-charter-ready-for-a-new-pricing-model/#3b859a7d688c [https://
perma.cc/W82B-B5D2].
18 See, e.g., Jet Card Comparisons by Company, PRIVATE JET CARD COMPARISONS,
https://privatejetcardcomparisons.com/jet-card-comparisons-by-company/
[https://perma.cc/M2KJ-U4J7] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (from 2000–2016,
twenty-nine new major jet card companies were added, with five added in 2016
alone).
19 See Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 59,880, 59,882 (proposed Sept. 30, 2013).
20 See Fractional Jet Cards, SHERPA RPT., https://www.sherpareport.com/air-
craft/jet-cards.html [https://perma.cc/C8QG-YX58] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019)
(twenty-five hours of flight time on an average jet card using an average light
private jet costs between $145,000 and $165,000).
21 See Dombroff, supra note 6.
22 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16.
23 See Doug Gollan, How to Compare Jet Cards and Charter, FORBES (Dec. 31,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/douggollan/2018/12/31/how-to-compare-
jet-cards-and-charter/#6d4ec4031cf2 [https://perma.cc/UT5C-SUQ5].
24 14 C.F.R. § 135.1 (2014).
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through a charter operation. This avoids a brokerage fee. How-
ever, for a user to track down a specific charter operation in its
area that will provide a specific flight is a very tedious task.25 Air
charter brokers are not paid for doing nothing. In fact, an inex-
perienced user can end up paying significantly more if they are
unprepared for back haul fees and fees incurred when the air-
craft is sitting at the user’s destination.26 Air charter brokers can
often match users on their trips to split these costs and alleviate
some of the financial burden of chartering an aircraft. As such,
it takes a tremendous amount of time and expertise for a user to
charter an aircraft in the most cost-effective way possible.
On September 17, 2018, the DOT finalized its rule making for
air charter brokers.27 These new rules allow air charter brokers a
blanket exemption from the civil penalties associated with offer-
ing unauthorized air transportation.28 Further, the new rules
provide exact guidelines for what air charter brokers can and
cannot do.29 Through these regulations, the DOT has made it
easier for air charter brokers to offer a wider variety of services
to more passengers. This wider variety of services allows for
more flexible, by-the-seat or by-the-hour charter services.30 It al-
lows expansion of the offerings of existing brokerage services
and paves the way for more jet cards or “jet-app” companies to
operate in the space.31 This “uberization” of private air travel
will undoubtedly have many significant legal implications, some
of which are unanticipated by regulators. Important upcoming
issues likely include: (1) accountability measures; (2) ensuring
maintenance of aircraft insurance; (3) tort liability; (4) jurisdic-
tional issues; (5) potential new entrants to the business space;
(6) air charter broker required disclosures; (7) meeting the def-
inition of “air charter broker”; (8) unfair and deceptive prac-
tices litigation; and (9) corporate structuring, to name a few.32
25 See Gollan, Is Private Jet Charter Ready for a New Pricing Model?, supra note 17.
26 See Gollan, How to Compare Jet Cards and Charter, supra note 23.
27 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867 (Sept.
17, 2018).
28 See id. at 46,875 (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 295.10).
29 Id. at 46,875–76.
30 Cf. Baxt & Palen, supra note 5, at 9.
31 See id.
32 See generally, e.g., Dombroff, supra note 6; Ben Popper & Colin Lecher, Flight
Risk, VERGE (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/28/15055046/
jetsmarter-app-membership-cost-reviews-high-prices-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/
5PWR-QWTC].
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This rule will likely have a positive impact on the air charter
industry. The new rules allow for more competition, more
unique ways of flying privately, more customer access, and with
increased use, more excise tax revenue for the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the DOT to fund aircraft safety mea-
sures.33 Further, the new rules allow for more ingenuity. This
includes more Uber-like services in the private aviation indus-
try.34 New technology is important to revolutionize the rather
stagnant area of general aviation.
Uber, Inc. is a ride-hailing technology.35 Through the Uber
application, a user may complete a five-step process to get a ride
from point to point in a vehicle.36 First, the user opens the appli-
cation on his or her internet-connected device, and inputs a des-
tination, pickup point, time, and car.37 The user is then
matched with a driver.38 The driver picks up the rider, then
takes the rider to the desired destination.39 Finally, the driver
and user rate and review each other.40 This service is available in
almost any major city nationwide.41 As proposed, after the new
rule for air charter brokers goes into effect, there is no reason
why this same business model could not apply to the air charter
business.
Uber already offers a similar ride-hailing service for private
jets.42 However, under current legislation, there is limited com-
petition in the space, allowing UberJets (a similarly named but
separate company from Uber)43 to charge a $5,000 initiation
fee, plus a $9,500 per year membership fee to access the ser-
33 See Airport & Airway Trust Fund (AATF), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/about/budget/aatf/ [https://perma.cc/VZ3Q-7TAD] (last modi-
fied June 24, 2019) (explaining that excise taxes from passenger flights are the
largest source of revenue for the FAA’s Airport and Airway Trust Fund).
34 See, e.g., UBERJETS, https://flyuberjets.com/ [https://perma.cc/UP2K-S64V]
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
35 How Uber Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/about/how-does-uber-work/






41 Find Uber in Cities Around the World, UBER, https://www.uber.com/global/
en/cities/ [https://perma.cc/LBE5-BP49] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
42 See UBERJETS, supra note 34.
43 Mike Arnot, These Startups Will Get You on a Private Jet—At a Fraction of the
Typical Cost, AFAR (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.afar.com/magazine/these-start
ups-will-get-you-on-a-private-jet-at-a-fraction-of-the-typical-cost [https://perma.cc/
7ZMG-VMJC].
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vice.44 It is significant to note that UberJets has a limited num-
ber of destinations it services and is in a primary stage of
growth.45 The DOT Final Rule on air charter brokers will un-
doubtedly invite further competition and fee compression into
the air charter broker business.
This Comment will cover the DOT’s Final Rule on air charter
brokers.46 Part II will analyze the historical background of air
charter broker regulation. Part III will analyze the provisions of
the new Final Rule on Air Charter Brokers in text. Part IV will
discuss the potential industry impact provided by this regulatory
change.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. 2007 ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
On January 26, 2007, the DOT released its Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking entitled “Consumer Information Re-
garding On-Demand Air Taxi Operations.”47 The advanced no-
tice sought input from the private aviation community.48 The
primary purpose of this inquiry was to determine industry best
practices for increasing transparency between all parties in-
volved in the charter of an aircraft.49
1. Dick Ebersol Disaster
An airplane crash in Montrose, Colorado sparked the DOT’s
interest in making a new set of Air Charter Broker rules.50 On
November 28, 2004, a chartered Canadair CL-600-2A12 crashed
upon takeoff, killing three and seriously injuring the other three
44 See Initiation & Annual Membership Package, UBERJETS, https://flyuberjets.
com/product/uberjets-initiation-annual-membership-package/ [https://
perma.cc/V9TG-PM5W] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
45 See, e.g., Jen Wieczner, Uber Is Finally Offering UberJET Flights Again This Week-
end, FORTUNE (June 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/17/uber-uberjet-
romania/ [https://perma.cc/5WVC-2VLV].
46 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867 (Sept.
17, 2018).
47 Consumer Information Regarding On-Demand Air Taxi Operations, 72 Fed.
Reg. 3773 (Jan. 26, 2007).
48 Id. at 3773.
49 Id. at 3774.
50 Id.
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occupants.51 Among the three survivors was the NBC Universal
executive Dick Ebersol.52
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) crash re-
port cites pilot inexperience and failure to ensure the wing tops
were free of ice as causes for the disaster.53 However, the NTSB
noted other “non-causal factors that the Safety Board felt could
nevertheless play a role in the safety choices that customers
make when contracting for on-demand air taxi transportation
with air charter companies.”54 One of these factors was “a lack of
transparency such that a customer or passenger may not know
the identities of those businesses providing them with on-de-
mand air transportation services, hindering those persons’ abili-
ties to make decisions based on safety considerations.”55
Consumers of on-demand air charter services often do not
know exactly with whom they are contracting. For example, in
the November 28, 2004, crash, the aircraft was operated by Air
Castle Corporation.56 Air Castle Corporation was “authorized to
do business as California Airways, Global Airways, and Global
Aviation.”57 Further, “Air Castle Corporation was owned by
Winfair Aviation Group, which also owned several other compa-
nies, including Hop-A-Jet which leased the accident aircraft to
Air Castle.”58 Air Castle Corporation had a significantly poorer
safety record than Key Air.59
It is incredibly important to have information clarity because
air charter operators often sell specified trips on a secondary
market.60 In this case, Air Castle was not the original charter
51 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AVIATION ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT,
#DEN05MA029, at 1 (2006).
52 See Richard Sandomir, Ebersol Is Haunted by a Day in November, N.Y. TIMES
(June 2, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/sports/othersports/
ebersol-is-haunted-by-a-day-in-november.html [https://perma.cc/VD5K-98JA]
(Dick Ebersol is largely responsible for programing including the Olympics and
the National Football League (NFL) being televised on NBC).
53 AVIATION ACCIDENT FINAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 1.
54 Consumer Information Regarding On-Demand Air Taxi Operations, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 3774.
55 Id.
56 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, at 1 (2006).
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id.
59 See Walter H. Hinton, II, New Air Charter Transparency Rules Proposed, LEX-
OLOGY (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=A9203
998-c340-4ef2-95f1-ea8c4076d12f [https://perma.cc/AP9S-EEVX].
60 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 2.
2019] “UBERIZATION” OF PRIVATE AIR TRAVEL 455
operator contracted.61 In fact, the “[p]assengers had arranged
the flight with Key Air, an operator they had used in previous
charter flights.”62 Key Air sold the trip on the secondary market
to Air Castle Corporation.63 This is normal practice in the air
charter industry.64 As such, customers often have no idea which
charter operator will actually be conducting their chartered
flight.65
2. NTSB Recommendations
Currently, Part 135 and 121 operators “may not operate an
aircraft . . . using a business name other than a business name
appearing in the certificate holder’s operations specifications.”66
Additionally, such an operator must “legibly display[ ]” the
“name of the certificate holder who is operating the aircraft, or
the air carrier or operating certificate number of the certificate
holder who is operating the aircraft.”67 Notably, these displays
do not have to display the true name of the operator of the
flight.68 This prevents users from identifying important informa-
tion about their aircraft charter, including important safety re-
cord information. The lack of transparency results in chartering
entities hiring a potentially unsafe operator with no way of
knowing the operator’s poor safety record before chartering the
airplane.
As a result of the general lack of information transparency,
the NTSB initially recommended greater disclosure require-
ments for Part 135 operators.69 This initial recommendation by
the NTSB to the DOT sought to require Part 135 operators to
disclose: (1) “the name of the company with operational control
of the flight, including any ‘doing business as’ names contained
in the operations specifications”; (2) “the name of the aircraft






65 See id. at 1.
66 14 C.F.R. § 119.9(a) (1997).
67 Id. § 119.9(b).
68 SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 2.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 3.
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3. Department of Transportation Adoption
The DOT presented these NTSB suggestions in its 2007 Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR).71 The DOT
agreed that, “adequate information is essential in order that
consumers be afforded the opportunity to make informed deci-
sions about their flight choices.”72 The DOT also asked the
broader aviation community for suggestions on the best way to
implement the NTSB recommendations.73
To support this proposition, the DOT pointed to statutory au-
thority, previous actions of the Office of the Assistant General
Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings, and the in-
crease of Part 135 operators in recent years.74 The DOT cited
statutory authority to support the recommended disclosure re-
quirements.75 14 C.F.R. § 399.80 outlines the unfair and decep-
tive practices of ticket agents.76 Likewise, “it would be a
deceptive practice . . . for an air taxi to misidentify to a customer
the carrier actually operating a flight.”77
B. 2013 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
On September 30, 2013, the DOT released its Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking (NPRM) entitled “Enhanced Consumer Pro-
tections for Charter Air Transportation.”78 This NPRM
proposed to: (1) address the NTSB disclosure recommenda-
tions; (2) create a new class of indirect air carriers called “air
charter broker[s]”; (3) codify exemption authority for air ambu-
lance services; and (4) “[c]larif[y] and codif[y] that certain air
services performed under contract with the Federal government
are in common carriage.”79 This Comment discusses only the
first two proposals.
71 Consumer Information Regarding On-Demand Air Taxi Operations, 72 Fed.
Reg. 3773, 3773 (Jan. 26, 2007).
72 Id. at 3774.
73 Id. at 3774–75.
74 Id. at 3774.
75 Id.
76 14 C.F.R. § 399.80 (2019).
77 Consumer Information Regarding On-Demand Air Taxi Operations, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 3774.
78 Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 59,880 (Sept. 30, 2013).
79 Id. at 59,880–81.
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1. Response to Disclosure Requirement Comments
The 2013 NPRM addressed the four NTSB disclosure require-
ment recommendations.80 The NTSB recommended that cus-
tomers and passengers of aircraft charter have a right to be
informed of:
(1) The name of the company in operational control of the air-
craft during flight; (2) any other “doing business as” names con-
tained in the Operations Specifications of the carrier in
operational control during the flight; (3) the name of the air-
craft owner; and (4) the names of all brokers involved in arrang-
ing the flight.81
These disclosure requirements were met with support from the
ANPR commenters.82 Further, the DOT adopted the NTSB’s
logic and accepted that, since deceptive practices are prohibited
under different circumstances, they should be more heavily reg-
ulated with respect to aircraft charter.83 As such, the DOT pro-
posed requiring air taxis and commuter air carriers to disclose:
(1) “[t]he corporate name of the direct air carrier in opera-
tional control of the aircraft”; (2) “the capacity in which the air
taxi is acting in contracting for the air transportation”; (3) “the
existence of any corporate or pre-existing business relationship
with the direct air carrier”; (4) “the make and model of the air-
craft”; (5) “the total cost of the air transportation”; and (6) “the
existence of any fees and their amounts.”84
Additionally, if there is a change in operating entity after the
charter contract has been signed, the operator would have to
provide the customer with written notice of the change.85 The
DOT proposed a “reasonable” time requirement for the provi-
sion of this notice.86 Per its guidelines, reasonable is defined as
approximately twenty-four hours before the proposed flight.87 A
reasonable amount of time means a sufficent amount of time to
give the customer time “to make an informed decision as to
whether he or she wants to accept the change.”88 The DOT pro-
posed that a failure to provide adequate notice would entitle the
80 Id. at 59,881.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 59,880, 59,883.
84 Id. at 59,881.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 59,884.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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customer to a full refund.89 The notice requirement does not
require confirmation or customer receipt.90
2. Creation of the Air Charter Broker Terminology
In the 2013 NPRM, the DOT defined an “air charter broker”
as “persons or companies that do not currently hold DOT eco-
nomic authority to function either as an indirect air carrier or as
a direct air carrier, but that arrange air transportation services
for prospective charter customers (charterers) to be provided by
direct air carriers.”91 This distinction was made to require cer-
tain disclosures for entities falling within the definition of air
charter broker.92 At the time of the NPRM, brokers “ha[d] no
authority to hold out air transportation in their own right as a
direct or an indirect air carrier . . . .”93 As a result, the majority
of brokers acted as a charter or charterer agent.94 At the time,
an air charter broker was considered a “ticket agent.”95 Ticket
agents are defined as “a person . . . that as a principal or agent
sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out as selling,
providing, or arranging for, air transportation.”96
The growth of the business aviation market and the advent of
the internet have increased the scope of the air charter broker’s
role.97 In response, the DOT has conducted extensive “industry
outreach” to dissuade air charter brokers from misleading the
public and has taken action against those who have.98
Under current regulations, “an air carrier may provide air
transportation only if the air carrier holds a certificate . . . au-
thorizing the air transportation.”99 However, an air carrier may
operate pursuant to an exemption granted by the DOT.100 It is
important to note that this certification requirement applies
equally to Direct Air Carriers (DAC) and Indirect Air Carriers
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 59,882.
92 See id. at 59,884.
93 Id. at 59,882.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(45) (2012).
97 Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 59,882.
98 Id.
99 49 U.S.C. § 41101(a)(1) (2012).
100 Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 59,880.
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(IAC).101 A DAC is a “certificated commuter . . . that directly
engages in the operation of aircraft,” while an IAC is “any per-
son who undertakes to engage indirectly in air transportation
operations and who uses for such transportation the services of a
direct air carrier.”102 An air charter broker is considered an
IAC.103
The DOT stressed its important mission of letting the market-
place self-govern as the main reason it had allowed IAC’s to en-
gage in air transportation in the past.104 The DOT has regulated
the activities of air charter brokers acting as ticket agents by
prohibiting them from misleading the public.105 Ticket agents
are prohibited from:
(1) [m]isleading the public into believing they are air carriers;
(2) misleading the public about the qualifications of pilots or the
safety record or certification of air carriers, aircraft, or crew: (3)
misleading the public about the quality or kind of service . . .;
and (4) selling air transportation without a binding commitment
with a direct air carrier for that transportation.106
In 2013, the DOT notified the air charter broker community of
these prohibitions through an official NPRM.107 Although not
allowed, the DOT recognized the economic benefit for air char-
ter brokers if they were allowed “to act as a principal in provid-
ing air transportation.”108
By its own admission, the DOT agreed that “the regulations
that now exist to authorize indirect air carriers to engage in pas-
senger air transportation are not conducive to the industry
served by air charter brokers.”109 This is due to the expansive
growth in the role of air charter brokers in recent years.110 It has
prevented air charter brokers from taking advantage of “the au-
thorizations . . . for other indirect air carriers,” thus, stifling “in-
novation and consumer benefits.”111
101 Id. at 59,882.
102 14 C.F.R. § 380.2 (2005).
103 Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 59,883.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 59,882.
106 Id. at 59,883.
107 Id. at 59,880.
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The unique position of air charter customers required revisit-
ing the rules regulating air charter brokers.112 Air charter cus-
tomers are often high net worth individuals or business.113 An
inherent issue with this customer base is that their flight itiner-
ary is subject to change at any time, including during the
flight.114 This is a major reason why the DOT did not lump air
charter brokers into the existing Part 380 regulations.115 It is this
unique set of circumstances that prompted the DOT to propose
that air charter brokers operate as IACs, “subject to appropriate
consumer protection provisions.”116 In fact, the proposal creates
a subsection of IACs specific to air charter brokers.117
Air charter brokers would “self-identify” as IACs under the
proposal.118 This would mean no formal licensure require-
ment.119 It would also allow “individuals who self-aggregate to
form a single entity” to be air charter brokers.120 Presumably,
this would allow fractional ownership programs to self-identify
as IAC air charter brokers. The DOT also sought comment on
requirements for licensure of non-U.S. citizen air charter
brokers.121
It is important to note that the proposal to create the air char-
ter broker classification would require air charter brokers to
make all of the proposed disclosure requirements (described in
section II.A) and one additional disclosure.122 This additional
disclosure is “the existence or absence of liability insurance held
by the air charter broker . . . and the monetary limits of any such
insurance.”123 The DOT proposes the same reasonable notice
requirement described above.124 The penalty for failure to pro-
vide reasonable notice of the required disclosures would be a
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Under this DOT proposal, the total cost of the air charter dis-
closure requirement would be satisfied if the air charter broker
“discloses the existence of all items that may impact the total
cost, including the range of fees associated for each item, as well
as any factors which would cause the fees to be in the high or
low range.”126 This flexible approach is needed due to the inher-
ent nature of aviation.127 Many times, fuel, hangar, and de-icing
prices vary in real time.128 This flexible approach allows wiggle
room for the final total cost and protects the consumer by in-
forming them of the range of possible process.129
Final proposals included: (1) requiring air charter brokers to
maintain a dedicated cash fund for refund purposes; (2)
enumerating “unfair and deceptive practices” and “unfair meth-
ods of competition”; and (3) record maintenance
requirements.130
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
On September 17, 2018, the DOT issued its final rule entitled
“Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options.”131 The stated
mission of the final rule is to “facilitate innovation and growth in
the air charter industry while strengthening the legal protec-
tions provided to consumers of charter air transportation.”132
Most importantly, it allows air charter brokers to act as princi-
pals “to provide single entity charter air transportation of pas-
sengers.”133 Additionally, the final rule prescribes the required
disclosures and prohibited deceptive practices for air charter
brokers.134 The rule went into effect on February 14, 2019.135
A. NEW CLASS OF INDIRECT AIR CARRIER
There are several changes from the NPRM to the final rule
with respect to air charter brokers. The term air charter brokers





130 Id. at 59,882–85.
131 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867 (Sept.
17, 2018).
132 Id. at 46,867.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 46,868.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 46,869.
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was not necessary to create a registry of air charter brokers.137
Finally, the DOT adopted the definition of “single entity char-
ter” to include “self-aggregated individuals.”138 These changes
were made as a result of industry comments.139
New Code of Federal Regulations sections relevant to air char-
ter brokers generally include: 14 C.F.R. §§ 295.1, 295.3, 295.5,
295.7, 295.10, and 295.12.140
Purpose. The DOT defines an air charter broker as “an indirect
air carrier, foreign indirect air carrier or a bona fide agent.”141
Air charter brokers provide “indirect air transportation of pas-
sengers on single entity charters aboard large and small air-
craft.”142 It is important to note that the term “single entity”
includes “self-aggregated individuals.”143
Applicability. These rules apply to “any person or entity acting
as an air charter broker.”144
Definitions. An air charter broker is “a person or entity that, as
an indirect air carrier, foreign indirect air carrier, or a bona fide
agent, holds out, sells, or arranges single entity air transporta-
tion using a direct air carrier.”145 A bona fide agent is an agent
“appointed or authorized” to act on behalf of an air charter bro-
ker, charterer, or direct air carrier.146 A charterer is the person
or entity who charters the aircraft.147 A direct air carrier offers
air transportation and has operational control of the aircraft.148
An indirect air carrier “arranges air transportation and sepa-
rately contracts with direct air carriers.”149 A large aircraft has a
capacity of “more than 60 seats or a maximum payload capacity
of more than 18,000 pounds.”150 A small aircraft has a “capacity





140 Id. at 46,888.
141 14 C.F.R § 295.1 (2019).
142 Id.
143 See id. § 295.5(h).
144 Id. § 295.3.
145 Id. § 295.5(b).
146 Id. § 295.5(c).
147 Id. § 295.5(d).
148 Id. § 295.5(f).
149 Id. § 295.5(g).
150 Id. § 295.5(j).
151 Id. § 295.5(k).
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One of the most important definitions of Part 295 is that of
“single entity charter.”152 Under Part 295, single entity charter
means “a charter for the entire capacity of the aircraft, the cost
of which is borne by the charterer and not directly or indirectly
by individual passengers, except when individual passengers self-
aggregate to form a single entity for flights to be operated using
small aircraft.”153 The “self-aggregation” distinction allows pas-
sengers who band together to charter a small aircraft and dis-
tribute the associated costs amongst themselves.154
Agency Relationships. An air charter broker can act as a “bona
fide agent” with express authorization from a “charterer, direct
air carrier, or foreign direct air carrier.”155
Authority and Exemptions. Air charter brokers are exempt from
provisions of the United States Code pertaining to air carrier
certificates,156 foreign air transportation,157 and pricing.158 How-
ever, they are still required to abide by the foreign air transpor-
tation anti-discrimination statute.159 The DOT can revoke this
exemption “in the public interest” or “to protect the traveling
public” without a hearing.160
B. CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
Concluding that “consumers, regardless of sophistication
level, would benefit from an increased amount of information,”
the DOT decided to require three of the proposed disclosures
and make the other three available on request.161 The DOT
dropped entirely the requirement that the “type of aircraft be
disclosed” because that information is already disclosed through
contract negotiations virtually every time.162 The DOT also
dropped the insurance requirement and adopted a reasonable
time requirement for making the required disclosures.163 There
152 See id. § 295.5(h).
153 Id.
154 See Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867,
46,869 (Sept. 17, 2018).
155 14 C.F.R. § 295.7.
156 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. at 46,875 (ex-
empting brokers from 49 U.S.C. §§ 41101–41113).
157 Id. (exempting brokers from 49 U.S.C. §§ 41301–41313).
158 Id. (exempting brokers from 49 U.S.C. §§ 41501–41511).
159 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41310).
160 14 C.F.R. § 295.12 (2019).
161 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. at 46,870.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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is no confirmation requirement for notice.164 The DOT adopted
the refund requirement for failure to provide notice.165
New Code of Federal Regulations sections relevant to the dis-
closure requirements for air charter brokers include: 14 C.F.R.
§§ 295.20, 295.23, 295.24, and 295.26.166
Air charter brokers are not permitted to arrange charter ser-
vices with direct air carriers that lack authority to provide their
services from the DOT or the FAA.167 All advertising produced
by air charter brokers must contain an accompanying disclo-
sure.168 This disclosure must state that “the air charter broker is
an air charter broker” and “it is not a direct air carrier . . . in
operational control of aircraft, and that the air service adver-
tised shall be provided by a properly licensed direct air car-
rier.”169 The air charter broker may advertise on aircraft so long
as the direct air carrier’s name is displayed in a way that is not
confusing to consumers.170
Prior to entering into a contract for a flight with a charterer,
the air charter broker must at least disclose: (1) the corporate
name of the direct air carrier including any “doing business as”
(d/b/a) names; (2) whether the air charter broker is the DAC’s
agent; and (3) the existence of the air charter broker’s liability
insurance and its limit.171 Upon request of the charterer, an air
charter broker must disclose: (1) the existence of a business re-
lationship with the direct air carrier, if acting as the charterer’s
agent; (2) the “total cost of the air transportation,” including
taxes and fees; and (3) any third-party fees and their amount if
known or a reasonable estimate if unknown.172 If the air charter
broker does not know any of this information or it changes, they
must disclose the change within a reasonable time after it be-
comes known.173 As discussed in the notice, a reasonable time is
approximately twenty-four hours after such information be-
comes known, as long as the charterer can make an informed
decision as to whether he or she wants to accept the additional
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 Id. at 46,869.
167 See 14 C.F.R. § 295.20 (2019).
168 Id. § 295.23(a).
169 Id.
170 See id. § 295.23(b).
171 Id. § 295.24(a)(1)–(2), (6).
172 Id. § 295.24(a)(3)–(5).
173 Id. § 295.24(b).
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information or the change.174 Failure to disclose this informa-
tion results in a “full refund of any monies paid for the charter
air transportation and services” within twenty days of a request
by the charterer.175
C. UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
The DOT decided to codify all deceptive practices enumer-
ated in the NPRM.176 This is because of the significant enforce-
ment actions the DOT has already taken against air charter
brokers regarding deceptive practices.177 Also cited for the enu-
meration is clarification and notice of what is and is not an un-
fair practice.178 The DOT did not codify a specific record
retention period requirement for air charter brokers.179
The new Code of Federal Regulations sections relevant to the
unfair and deceptive practices for air charter brokers include:
14 §§ C.F.R. 295.22 and 295.50.180
Air charter brokers are prohibited from engaging in “unfair
or deceptive practice[s] or unfair method[s] of competition.”181
The new rule enumerates eleven deceptive or unfair prac-
tices.182 Such enumerated unfair practices are in violation of the
United States Code.183 Enumerated unfair or deceptive practices
include: (1) inducing the public to “reasonably believe” an air
charter broker is a direct air carrier; (2) “[m]isrepresentations
as to the quality or kind of service or type of aircraft”; (3)
“[m]isrepresntations as to the time of departure or arrival,
points served, route to be flown, stops to be made, or total trip-
time from point of departure to destination”; and (4)
“[m]isrepresentations as to the qualifications of pilots or safety
record or certification of pilots, aircraft, or air carriers.”184 An
air charter broker may not make misrepresentations with re-
spect to insurance, fares, charges, or membership in an air char-
174 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867, 46,870
(Sept. 17, 2018).
175 See id. at 46,876.




180 Id. at 46,870.
181 14 C.F.R. § 295.22 (2019).
182 Id. § 295.50(b)(1)–(11).
183 Id. § 295.50(b) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41712).
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ter broker auditing committee.185 An air charter broker may not
tell a charterer that a flight has been arranged without a binding
commitment from the direct air carrier.186 Further, an air char-
ter broker may not advertise in a confusing manner or misrepre-
sent charterer requirements.187
IV. ANALYSIS
The DOT has delivered an impressive set of regulations with
Part 295. With the stated purpose of revolutionizing the world of
private air charter, Part 295 will undoubtedly have a long-lasting
impact.188 The new classification of air charter broker gives po-
tential entrants a set of rules with which to structure their enter-
prises.189 Prior to these regulations, the world of air charter
brokerage was essentially the “wild west.” Now, air charter con-
sumers will have mandatory access to all the information needed
to make informed decisions about their charter transporta-
tion.190 Previously, these consumers rarely knew what they were
purchasing. The lack of transparency led to accidents, death,
and significant enforcement action by the DOT.191 It also al-
lowed a few established charter broker operations to capitalize
on the lack of clear information.192 Now that air charter brokers
are required to disclose information, consumers can make more
informed financial decisions as well. Required disclosures result
in smaller brokerage fees, more competition, and a closer rela-
tionship between air charterers and Part 135 charter opera-
tors,193 while also increasing the safety of aircraft charter as an
alternative to conventional commercial aviation, fractional own-
ership, and full ownership programs.
185 Id. § 295.50(b)(5)–(7).
186 Id. § 295.50(b)(8).
187 See id. § 295.50(b)(9)–(11).
188 See id. § 295.1.
189 See id.
190 See id. §§ 295.20, 295.23–295.26.
191 See Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78
Fed. Reg. 59,880, 59,881–82 (Sept. 30, 2013).
192 Cf. SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 1–2.
193 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAB-06/03, CRASH DURING TAKEOFF IN
ICING CONDITIONS CANADAIR, LTD., CL-600-2A12, N873G, MONTROSE, COLORADO,
NOVEMBER 28, 2004, at 24–27 (2006) (concurring statement of NTSB member
Deborah A.P. Hersman); Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Trans-
portation, 78 Fed. Reg. at 59,882; cf. Gollan, Is Private Jet Charter Ready for a New
Pricing Model?, supra note 17.
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The first part of this Section hypothesizes how an Uber-type
company could expand into the aircraft charter space. It ana-
lyzes how the company could fully comply with Part 295 while
introducing a market-disrupting technology. The second part of
this Section discusses the important increase in safety provided
by Part 295. Increasing safety in the private air charter industry
will undoubtedly entice more consumers and ensure the contin-
ued vitality of Part 135 aircraft charter operations.
A. THE IMPACT OF SELF-AGGREGATION
UberJets is a private jet service that allows users to use a simi-
lar app platform as the Uber ride hailing service to summon
private aircraft.194 This is one of the most progressive services of
its kind at this time. Due to the new regulations released by the
DOT, more ride-hailing type services are likely to spring up. The
allowance of self-aggregation by the new rules allows this type of
service.195 While Part 295 applies only to single entity air charter,
it defines self-aggregated groups as a single entity.196 Self-aggre-
gation allows charterers seeking charter air transportation to
band together and charter an aircraft as a single entity.197 These
persons may self-aggregate and charter a small aircraft.198 While
the term “small aircraft” may not sound that impressive, as de-
fined, a “small aircraft” may hold up to sixty passengers and
have a maximum payload of 18,000 pounds.199 The most impor-
tant aspect of this distinction is that these persons may charter
aircraft from Part 135 operators through an air charter bro-
ker.200 This means that there is no need to comply with ticketing
requirements and the extensive Part 121 Air Carrier Certifica-
tion process.201
Charterers can now self-aggregate to charter an entire aircraft
while splitting the cost of the charter between themselves.202
This makes chartering aircraft significantly more cost effective
for the individual charterer. It also ushers in use of an applica-
194 See Wieczner, supra note 45.
195 See 14 C.F.R. § 295.5(h) (2019).
196 Id. §§ 295.3, 295.5(h).
197 See id. § 295.5(h).
198 Id.
199 See id. § 295.5(k).
200 See id. § 295.5(f); see also 14 C.F.R. pt. 135.
201 See id. § 295.10, see also 14 C.F.R. pt. 121.
202 See id. § 295.10.
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tion or “app”203 for chartering aircraft.204 Uber, Inc. already em-
ploys a similar technology in their ride-hailing app, but the
company has not extended the exact same technology to its pri-
vate aviation service.205 Using the Uber ride-hailing app, con-
sumers may request a ride to and from any destination.206 An
Uber driver may accept or pass up the ride.207 Users input basic
categories, such as the size and status of the vehicle they re-
quest.208 However, they may not request a specific make and
model of car.209 Similar technology is now applicable to charter-
ing aircraft. The software can act as an air charter broker. Users
may request the route and general type of aircraft they desire.210
The Part 135 charter operator (the driver, by analogy in this
instance) would then accept or decline the proposed air trans-
portation route. Users would be able to self-aggregate for popu-
lar routes and split the fee demanded by the Part 135 operator
on a pro rata basis.211
The more users that take a proposed trip, the cheaper the pro
rata rate becomes. Wheels Up, an aircraft charter membership
program, already offers a similar service.212 This service is availa-
ble through its proprietary app.213 Under its Core Membership
plan, users have access to only two models of aircraft in a fixed
pool of aircraft managed by Wheels Up.214 Additionally, users
must be members of Wheels Up to use the service.215 The most
basic membership fee is $2,995, plus $2,495 per year thereaf-
203 See App, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/application [https://perma.cc/SUM4-MZ8Q] (last visited
Nov. 7, 2019) (an app is a computer application “designed for a mobile device
(such as a smartphone)”).
204 See Tap-To-Book, UBERJETS, https://flyuberjets.com/tap-to-book/ [https://
perma.cc/HB3T-Q9NH] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
205 See Arnot, supra note 43.




210 Cf. Empty Legs, UBERJETS, https://flyuberjets.com/empty-legs/ [https://
perma.cc/T4H2-NDTD] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
211 See Baxt & Palen, supra note 5, at 9.
212 Shared Flights, WHEELS UP, https://wheelsup.com/socialaviation [https://
perma.cc/WS4C-42GU] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
213 Id.
214 See Wheels Up Core Membership, WHEELS UP, https://wheelsup.com/individ
ual-membership [https://perma.cc/LZZ6-HY7K] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
215 See Wheels Up Connect Membership, WHEELS UP, https://wheelsup.com/con
nect-membership [https://perma.cc/BM5W-R3VN] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
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ter.216 This is manifestly different than the standard Uber app.
The Uber app requires no associated fees aside from the fees for
car transportation.217 Due to the new additions of Part 295, it is
possible to have a direct relationship between the Part 135 oper-
ator and the charterer, much like Uber matches a user to a
driver.
To build a qualifying app that provides air transportation for
charterers in the same manner as Uber, one would have to en-
sure that it falls within the definition of air charter broker as an
indirect air carrier. The app would likely qualify as an “entity
acting as an air charter broker.”218 Additionally, it would arrange
single entity air transportation aboard small aircraft.219 As such,
the proposed app would fall within the purview of Part 295.
When there is an absence of an individual and charter trans-
portation is being arranged by a computer, there are unique is-
sues for disclosure. To address these, the required disclosures
could be prepared through the app’s interface. There would be
no issues with inadvertently representing as a direct air car-
rier.220 By its design, the app would be an intermediary between
the direct air carrier and the charterer. Further, by including
the required disclosure in all advertisements for the app, there
would be no issues with confusing the public as to its nature.221
There would be no need to advertise the app on the chartered
airplanes, but if a developer wished to do so, they could by en-
suring that the direct air carrier’s name is displayed prominently
on the aircraft as well.222
To satisfy the disclosure specific requirements of Part 295, a
similar strategy may be employed. As part of the listing within
the app, the corporate name of the direct air carrier would be
listed.223 A disclosure of the capacity in which the air charter
brokering app is acting as an indirect carrier would be displayed
on every page of the app, as would the air charter broker’s insur-
ance information.224 Those documents would be available to the
216 Id.
217 See How Much Does a Ride with Uber Cost?, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/
en/price-estimate/ [https://perma.cc/36GS-8CSL] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
218 See 14 C.F.R. § 295.3 (2019).
219 See id.
220 See id. § 295.23 (requiring charter materials to make clear the entity is not a
direct carrier).
221 See id. §§ 295.23–295.24(a).
222 See id. § 295.23(b).
223 See id. §§ 295.23(b)(1), 295.24(a)(1).
224 See id. § 295.24(b)(2), (6).
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charterer prior to entering into a contract for air service.225 Dis-
closure of the air charter broker’s relationship with the direct
air carrier, the total cost of the air transportation, and any asso-
ciated fees would be made available in real time prior to con-
tracting.226 This is similar to the way the Uber ride-hailing app
shows the user the estimated total cost of the trip prior to the
user confirming the ride and entering into a contract.227 In the
event of a disclosure mistake, when a user requests a refund, the
app would allow for prompt repayment of any monies paid by
the user through an electronic refund process.228 This could be
accomplished immediately through electronic bank transfer.229
An app-based air charter brokerage operation would not be
permitted to engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices.230 To
steer clear of these types of violations through misrepresenta-
tion, the app would need to take steps not to confuse the public
into thinking it was a direct air carrier. The best way to deal with
this is through transparency. The app should state that it is an
indirect air carrier acting as an air charter broker only.231 It
should make all information about each aircraft registered with
the app available to the user.232 It should not make any misrep-
resentations as to available routes or trip times.233 These times
should be given as estimates and clearly delineated as such. In
addition to aircraft information, all registered pilot and crew
member information should be accurate and made available to
the user prior to contracting a charter aircraft.234 Likewise, in-
surance information, contract details, and organizational in-
volvement of the air charter broker should be available to the
user at all times to avoid misrepresentation, including before
and after contract execution.235 In the app’s settings, each of
225 See id. § 295.24(a).
226 See id. § 295.24(b)(3)–(5) (listing the disclosures that may be requested by
the charterer).
227 See How Much Does a Ride with Uber Cost?, supra note 217.
228 See 14 C.F.R. § 295.26.
229 See, e.g., How It Works, VENMO, https://venmo.com/about/product/
[https://perma.cc/B8H5-CMKW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). Venmo is an incred-
ibly popular app that employs electronic bank transfers to immediately transfer
funds between user accounts. This same technology could be utilized to satisfy
refund requirements.
230 See 14 C.F.R. § 295.22.
231 See id. § 295.50(b)(1).
232 See id. § 295.50(b)(2).
233 See id. § 295.50(b)(3).
234 See id. § 295.50(b)(4).
235 See id. § 295.50(b)(6)–(9).
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these pieces of information could be easily displayed.236 As long
as they are, the air charter broker would be complying with the
requirements prohibiting deceptive trade practices.
From a practical standpoint, the proposed app would work in
a similar manner to a combination of Tinder and Uber, but for
charter aircraft. Tinder is a dating application that allows users
to post a profile including relevant information about them-
selves.237 Users then indicate interest in their counterparts by
swiping either left or right on their profile.238 A swipe right indi-
cates interest, while a swipe left indicates disinterest.239 This app
has become a cultural phenomenon due to its ease of use, suc-
cess rate, and intuitive interface.240
In the air charter context, direct air carriers or Part 135 oper-
ators could post a profile to the app for each aircraft they oper-
ate.241 This profile would include all required information by
Part 295, including estimated hourly cost. Additionally, it would
include available dates for each aircraft. Users would make a
similar profile including personal information. The app would
then allow users to filter based on destination, proposed time of
travel, estimated hourly cost, and desired type of aircraft.242
Once the user finds a potential match, they would swipe right
on the aircraft indicating to the charter operator that the user is
interested in chartering the specific aircraft for a specific trip.
The charter operator could then confirm or deny the proposal
and a contract would be entered into. The broker operating the
app would receive a flat percentage fee for every trip booked.243
236 See id. § 295.24(a) (permitting disclosures through electronic means).





240 See Taylor Soper, Tinder Founder Sean Rad Explains Why the Dating App Is So
Popular, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.geekwire.com/2015/tinder-
founder-sean-rad-explains-why-the-dating-app-is-so-popular/ [https://perma.cc/
E39D-UBDS].
241 See, e.g., Arnot, supra note 43.
242 Here, the desired type of aircraft means aircraft classification; for example,
a user could choose between single piston engine, single turboprop engine, twin
piston engine, twin turboprop engine, and twin jet engine.
243 This is similar to the operation of Airbnb or Vrbo, which are apps that
provide a platform for individuals wishing to rent out their property for a short
period of time. See What Is the Airbnb Service Fee?, AIRBNB, https://
www.airbnb.com/help/article/1857/what-is-the-airbnb-service-fee [https://
perma.cc/KQH6-B383] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019); Accommodation Fee Collection
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Due to the allowance of self-aggregation by Part 295, users of
the app could propose trips and date ranges. These proposals
could also feature a number of additional passengers that the
initial user is willing to allow onboard the chartered aircraft.244
Other users could see and filter these proposals. This is app
based self-aggregation. When additional users split a charter, the
app would automatically charge the user for only their pro rata
share of the charter fee.245
An adequate payment system would be paramount. For this
proposed app, electronic direct bank account transfers would be
available through the same interface.246 This would allow self-
aggregated single entities to instantly split a charter fee and pay
only their individual portion. It would also allow the charter op-
eration to be paid in a more expedient method than tradition-
ally employed.
An app of this nature would completely disrupt the air char-
ter, air charter brokerage, fractional ownership, and complete
ownership industries. By increasing competition and decreasing
the necessity for human air charter brokers, an app could serve
more users at a greatly compressed brokerage fee. Air charter
operators and charterers would enjoy easier access to each
other, free from incredibly expensive initiation fees and yearly
fees. Both parties would enjoy more money in their respective
pockets due to Part 295.
B. THE IMPACT OF INCREASED SAFETY AND DISCLOSURES
The boom of air charter brokerage in recent years requires an
equal boom in disclosure and transparency measures.247 One of
the main reasons cited by the DOT for Part 295 is this increase
in air charter consumption by corporations and the general
public.248 As with any market boom, regulation has lagged be-
hind enterprise.249 This lag contributed to the Montrose, Colo-
Agreement, VRBO, https://www.vrbo.com/legal/terms-and-conditions/hap-terms-
conditions [https://perma.cc/WW5N-FS4G] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
244 See Baxt & Palen, supra note 5, at 9.
245 See id.
246 See What Is ACH?, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/what-is-ach
[https://perma.cc/977H-XTV9] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
247 See SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 1.
248 Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 59,880, 59,882–83 (Sept. 30, 2013).
249 See generally Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When
Technology Is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 561 (2017).
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rado, airplane crash involving Dick Ebersol.250 It is also
responsible for numerous enforcement actions by the DOT.251
In the interim, many air charter brokers have sprung up with
less than satisfactory business practices.252
Part 295 codifies best practices for air charter brokers with a
single and vitally important mission—ensuring disclosure.253 By
ensuring disclosure, Part 295 arms charterers with the vital in-
formation they need to make safer charter decisions.254 Impor-
tant information relating to the air charter broker’s allegiance
to certain direct air carriers will also arm consumers with the
information they need to compress fees.255
This information is worthless unless it is used by the charterer.
The major counterargument to disclosure requirements under
Part 295 is that they will not matter.256 Charterers generally lack
the patience and knowledge to use information required to be
disclosed. If this information is not used to make safer choices at
the consumer level, then a major supporting reason for the dis-
closure requirement falls out of favor. To combat this, a ratings
system should be employed.
As a society, the incredible increase in information exchanged
on the internet has led to numerous, unprecedented advance-
ments.257 One of these is the advent of ratings websites.258 A rat-
ings website allows users to review their experience for virtually
anything.259 These websites are so popular that they have been
adapted to fit nearly every industry.260 To increase safety in the
air charter community, information related to the required dis-
closures could be arranged into a ratings website or as part of an
250 Cf. SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 1–3.
251 Enhanced Consumer Protections for Charter Air Transportation, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 59,883.
252 Id.
253 See generally 14 C.F.R. pt. 295.
254 See SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 1–2.
255 See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 295.20, 295.23–296.26.
256 Increasing Charter Air Transportation Options, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,867, 46,869
(Sept. 17, 2018).
257 Micha Kaufman, The Internet Revolution Is the New Industrial Revolution,
FORBES (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michakaufman/2012/10/
05/the-internet-revolution-is-the-new-industrial-revolution/#7875846147d5
[https://perma.cc/X4YW-NVMZ].
258 See Chris Campbell, Online Reviews Are the New Social Proof, ENTREPRENEUR
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app proposed in the previous section. On such a website, past
charterers could review both the direct air carrier and the air
charter broker on a variety of metrics. The metrics for the air
charter broker could include: (1) aviation knowledge; (2) “pro-
cess expertise”; (3) “responsiveness”; and (4) “negotiation
skills.”261
The metrics for rating a direct air carrier would not be user
generated. This is an important distinction. Due to the disclo-
sures required by Part 295, air charter brokers have to disclose
the direct air carrier, and they may not misrepresent the aircraft
that will be supplied for the charter trip.262 Because this infor-
mation must be disclosed, the website could automatically link
to the aviation accident database.263 This database is already
publicly available through the NTSB’s website.264 The registra-
tion number on each individual aircraft would be a definitive
link to any NTSB reports filed with regard to that aircraft, an
entity with operational control of that aircraft, or a crew mem-
ber of that aircraft.265 Other aircraft accident information that a
ratings website could use for this purpose includes: (1) accident
date; (2) accident location; (3) air carrier number; (4) purpose
of flight; and (5) the NTSB accident report number.266 In es-
sence, the required disclosures give charterers the key to unlock-
ing past information about the charter aircraft and operator
they are contracting with.
An NTSB report is required to be filed in a multitude of situa-
tions.267 Due to the expansive reporting requirements to the
261 See How to Find Your Perfect Real Estate Agent, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.
com/home-buying-guide/what-is-a-real-estate-broker [https://perma.cc/7BAQ-
WAV2] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). This mirrors the metrics tracked by Zillow, a
popular real estate rating website. Similar to real estate agents, air charter bro-
kers are in a brokerage industry often requiring disclosures and usually in a prin-
cipal–agent relationship.
262 14 C.F.R. §§ 295.24(a)(1), 295.50(b)(2) (2019).
263 See Aviation Accident Database & Synopses, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., https://
www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/9TJK-




267 See 49 C.F.R. § 830.5 (2016) (the NTSB shall be notified if there is: (1)
“[f]light control system malfunction or failure”; (2) “[i]nability of any required
flight crewmember to perform normal flight duties as a result of injury or illness”;
(3) engine component failure; (4) fire; (5) in-flight collision; (6) property dam-
age of more than $25,000; (7) “[r]elease of all or a portion of a propeller blade
from an aircraft”; (8) “complete loss of information . . . for more than 50 percent
of an aircraft’s cockpit display[ ]”; (9) violation of minimum clearance area be-
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NTSB, if a ratings website utilized this publicly available infor-
mation, it would give charterers a clearer picture of the safety
record of the direct air carrier. This does not just include air-
craft accidents. The reporting requirement covers unique in-
sights into the direct carrier’s operation. For example, if a direct
air carrier has had trouble with its crew’s ability to perform in
the past, the required NTSB reports would reveal that fact.268 If
a ratings platform such as the one proposed were implemented,
a charterer could be informed of this fact automatically and
prior to the trip. Another example is when a direct air carrier
lands on the wrong runway; there would be a required NTSB
report that would be revealed to the charterer in this
scenario.269
This information about direct air carriers has been publicly
available since 1995.270 However, through the deceptive prac-
tices of air charter brokers in the past, charterers often lacked
the required information to access these records.271 Part 295 has
given consumers the key to access important information. Now
that information is more freely available to all parties to a char-
ter transaction, safety will undoubtedly increase. The end con-
sumer now has the ability to contribute to industry oversight.
Consumers may vote with their dollars, incentivizing fully com-
pliant direct air carriers to provide a higher quality service. This
paradigm is increasingly important as the air charter industry
continues to grow with no end in sight.272
V. CONCLUSION
Part 295 is a useful set of regulations. It paves the way for the
future of charter operations and private, general aviation. It also
allows consumers to be more informed before they make deci-
sions about chartering an aircraft. The free flow of information
incentivizes air charter brokers to maintain insurance and place
trips with more reputable charter operators. Due to Part 295, in
the future, technology will allow ease of access to the general
tween aircraft on an instrument flight rules flight plan; (10) damage to a helicop-
ter requiring “major repair or replacement” of its blades; (11) landing or
departure on the wrong runway; (12) runway incursion; or (13) “[a]n aircraft is
overdue and is believed to have been involved in an accident.”).
268 See id. § 830.5(a)(2).
269 See id. § 830.5(a)(12)(i).
270 See id. § 830.5.
271 See SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-06-43, supra note 56, at 1–2.
272 See id. at 2.
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aviation charter market. Not only will the industry become more
cost effective, it will attract more customers. With an influx of
customers, capital, and further growth, the industry will un-
doubtedly require more employees. The net result of Part 295 is
an entrepreneurial environment fostering safety and increasing
employment opportunities.
